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Public Trust in the Regulatory Welfare State 
 
Dr. A. Tollenaar* 
 
 
Social security is by definition a mixture of public and private legal mecha-
nisms. This mixture is expected to provide efficient, tailor-made solutions that 
still meet public interests like reliability, solidarity and equity. From the per-
spective of the individual citizen, this mixture of instruments might seem rather 
confusing. The central question of this contribution is therefore: what are the 
consequences of the mixture of public and private social security for public 
trust?  
 
To answer this question, a model of the concept of ‘public trust’ must be con-
structed. This model contains four factors that might affect public trust. This 
model is then used to compare the social security for short-term disabled and 
sick employees in Germany and the Netherlands. The comparison focuses on the 
distribution of responsibilities and the criteria determining incapacity for work. 
The comparison shows that both countries score differently on the identified 





Social security is, by definition, a combination of public and private responsibil-
ities and regulation.1 Private social security is always the first safety net against 
the loss of income or poverty. Individual arrangements such as insurance and 
solidarity within a family or within a social group (charities) provide a certain 
protection against social risks. The instruments used are mainly contracts and 
gifts.2 Public social security is subsidiary and provides income security where 
private instruments fail. The instruments in the public sphere are mainly benefits 
based on statutory acts.3  
                                                 
*  Assistant Professor, University of Groningen, Faculty of Law, Department of Admin-
istrative Law & Public Administration, PO Box 716, 9700 AS Groningen, +31 50 363 
5394, a.tollenaar@rug.nl. 
1 D. Pieters, Social security: an introduction to the basic principles, Kluwer Law Inter-
national: Alphen aan den Rijn 2006, p. 137. 
2 J.B. Williamson & F.C. Pampel, ‘Does the privatization of social security make sense 
for developing nations?’ International Social Security Review 1998 (4), p. 3-31. 
3 A. Tollenaar, ‘Instrumentalisation of public interests: a legal perspective’, in: G.J. 
Vonk & A. Tollenaar (eds), Social security as a public interest: A multidisciplinary 
inquiry into the foundations of the regulatory welfare state, Intersentia: Antwerp 
2010.  





The last two decades show a new balance between these two types of instru-
ments. The modern approach is to use more private instruments to fulfil public 
goals. Public coverage decreases, leaving room for society and the market to 
provide a safety net. In the institutional framework one can observe the use of 
private instruments to create new incentives that are expected to enhance effi-
ciency.4 These instruments are often derived from the school of New Public 
Management, and result in the contracting out of social services, or in creating a 
market to enhance competition between public and private providers.5 
 
This contribution aims to explore the actual pathology of this public-private 
mixture in two modern welfare states and uses the perspective of the citizen. The 
question that will be addressed is: what are the consequences of the new balance 
between public and private social security for public trust?  
 
The answer to this question first requires an exploration of the public and private 
regulation in the welfare state (section 2). Then a model for public trust will be 
developed (section 3). This model is meant as an instrument to assess the public-
private mixture of welfare states and to identify potential threats therein for pub-
lic trust. This model is then used to compare two systems of social security (sec-
tion 4 and 5). Section 6 contains the concluding remarks.  
 
2. The rise of the regulatory welfare state 
 
A brief history of the welfare state 
 
Western European welfare states show a similar history. In the era of industriali-
sation employees and employers founded mutual funds as a safety net against 
employment related risks like industrial accidents or unemployment. Relief for 
the poor was provided by churches.6 In that period the role of the state was sub-
sidiary; it was first and foremost a private matter to organize social security. As 
Vonk & Katrougalos observe, the legal conceptualisation of social security 
emerged in the 19th century as an institutional answer to ‘the social question’ 
that dealt with the position of the powerful working class and the fear of social-
                                                 
4 J. Pacolet & V. Coudron, ‘De Europese verzorgingsstaten: op zoek naar tendensen 
binnen een economische en sociaal-politieke samenhang’ Belgisch Tijdschrift Voor 
Sociale Zekerheid 2006 (4), p. 495-586. 
5 M. Plantinga, J. De Ridder & A Corrà, ‘Choosing whether to buy or make: The con-
tracting out of employment reintegration services by Dutch municipalities’ Social 
Policy and Administration 2011(45), p. 245–263; S. Greß, ‘Regulated competition in 
social health insurance: a three country comparison’ International Social Security Re-
view 2006 (3), p. 27-47.; R. Böckman, ‘The Private Health Insurance: Demarketiza-
tion of a Welfare Market?’, German Policy Studies 2009 (1), p. 119-140. 
6 M. Dupeyroux, Ontwikkeling en tendenties van de stelsels van de sociale zekerheid 
der lidstaten van de Europese Gemeenschappen en Groot-Brittannië, EGKS Luxem-
burg 1966. 





ist revolution.7 This did not result in entitlements immediately, but merely in a 
facilitative role of the state to enable societal institutions, like churches and trade 
unions, to provide social security.  
 
The role of the state increased as a response to failure of these private institu-
tions. Churches only provided security for their members leaving large groups of 
paupers unprotected. The mutual funds went bankrupt in case of an incident, or 
were not reliable due to mismanagement.8 These apparent failures justified state 
interference. The Beveridge reports (1942) form an important milestone in this 
development. The state was given the responsibility for insurance against loss of 
income or poverty. Social security slowly transformed in a universal human 
right with the institutional framework of the International Labour Organisation 
and the Declaration of Philadelphia in 1944.  
 
In this public welfare state, benefits and provisions were mainly based on acts 
and statutes. Social assistance became a right instead of a gift and anonymous 
public bureaucracies slowly crowded out the civil society organisations making 
these groups less and less relevant. In the words of Levi-Faur, one could call this 
a phase of nationalisation.9  
 
The countermove emerged in the economic crisis of the last quarter of the 20th 
century. Public social security caused moral hazards: employers did not feel an 
incentive to invest in improving working conditions that might lower the risk of 
incidental accidents, and employees felt an incentive to claim for benefits.10 
Public bureaucracies lacked the capacity to verify claims resulting in an even 
further abuse of social schemes.11 
 
The burst of the public welfare state seemed inevitable. In many Western Euro-
pean states, the solution was found in two mechanisms. On the one side the reac-
tion was austerity: less public coverage and more repression for those relying on 
                                                 
7 G.J. Vonk & G. Katrougalos, ‘The public interest and the welfare state: a legal ap-
proach’, in: G.J. Vonk & A. Tollenaar (eds), Social security as a public interest: A 
multidisciplinary inquiry into the foundations of the regulatory welfare state, Intersen-
tia: Antwerp 2010, p. 69.  
8 P. Taylor-Gooby, New Risks, New Welfare. The transformation of the European Wel-
fare State, Oxford University Press: Oxford 2004, p. 2. 
9 D. Levi-Faur, ‘The odyssey of the regulatory state. Episode one: the rescue of the 
welfare state’ Jerusalem Papers in Regulation & Governance, Working paper No 39. 
2011, p. 22. 
10 A. Nentjes & E. Woerdman, ‘Instrumentalisation of the public interest in social secu-
rity: an economic perspective’, in: G.J. Vonk & A. Tollenaar (eds), Social security as 
a public interest: A multidisciplinary inquiry into the foundations of the regulatory 
welfare state, Antwerp: Intersentia 2010; C.A De Kam & F. Nypels, Afscheid van het 
paradijs: de herziening van de sociale zekerheid, Amsterdam: Contact 1984. 
11 P. Spicker, How social security works. An introduction to benefits in Britain, Bristol: 
The Policy Press 2011, p. 245. 





social security. The decrease of public coverage also meant a reshuffle of the 
rights and duties of employers and employees in labour law, creating new incen-
tives that would prevent using public means.12  
 
The second response was that of using ‘market type mechanisms’ meant as a 
tool to organize public coverage more efficiently.13 This development fits the 
school of New Public Management. Contracting out services and enhancing 
competition were thought to force agencies to act more efficiently. 14  What 
emerged is what one could call the ‘regulatory welfare state’.15  
 
Public interests in the regulatory welfare state  
 
To explore the regulatory welfare state, it is necessary to understand how public 
and private responsibilities are balanced. The regulatory welfare state is based 
on the notion that the state is responsible for the provision of social security for 
as far as public interests are involved.16 Public interests are those interests that 
go beyond the individual interests. In the hypothetical situation the market of 
supply and demand can serve these interests. Transactions will emerge, enlarg-
ing the welfare of the parties involved.17  
 
The history of the welfare states shows that private transactions are unable to 
provide sufficient security for all, causing the state to interfere. The first public 
interest is therefore that social security has to provide protection; a decent stand-
ard of living. This notion of protection is supported with two other public inter-
                                                 
12 A. Tollenaar, ‘Instrumentalisation of public interests: a legal perspective’, in: G.J. 
Vonk & A. Tollenaar (eds), Social security as a public interest: A multidisciplinary 
inquiry into the foundations of the regulatory welfare state, Antwerp: Intersentia 
2010. 
13 P. Taylor-Gooby, New Risks, New Welfare. The transformation of the European Wel-
fare State, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004, p. 3; J. de Ridder, ‘Instrumentalisa-
tion of public values in social security: a public administration perspective’, in: G.J. 
Vonk & A. Tollenaar (eds), Social security as a public interest: A multidisciplinary 
inquiry into the foundations of the regulatory welfare state, Antwerp: Intersentia 
2010.  
14 R Böckman, ‘The Private Health Insurance: Demarketization of a Welfare Market?’, 
German Policy Studies 2009 (1), p. 119. 
15 G.J. Vonk, ‘Social Security as a Public Interest, a Multidisciplinary Inquiry into the 
Foundations of the Regulatory Welfare state’, European Journal of Social Security 
2010 (1), p. 2 - 16. 
16 B. Bozeman, Public values and public interest. Counterbalancing economic individu-
alism, Washington: Georgetown University Press 2007; T.B. Jørgensen & B. Bo-
zeman, ‘Public Values: An Inventory’ Administration & Society 2007 (39), p. 354-
381. 
17 A. Nentjes & E. Woerdman, ‘Instrumentalisation of the public interest in social secu-
rity: an economic perspective’, in: G.J. Vonk & A. Tollenaar (eds), Social security as 
a public interest: A multidisciplinary inquiry into the foundations of the regulatory 
welfare state, Antwerp: Intersentia 2010. 





ests: participation and reliability. Public welfare supports its beneficiaries to 
participate, to earn an income and become independent from public support. In 
the early days of the public interference this notion was underlined in dogmatic 
pamphlets, such as the Rerum Novarum, in which the Catholic Church empha-
sised that the ‘man in the household’ should be enabled to take his responsibility 
for his family. Reliability is the other side of the coin: if the citizen has a valid 
claim on support, it is important that this claim can be realized. This calls for 
specific regulation ensuring the strength of the supporting mechanisms, like the 
cover ratio of the insurance fund.18 
 
These public interests form the core of the welfare state but do not prescribe the 
organisation of social security.19 After all: protection, participation and reliabil-
ity can be organized in either a public or a private environment, using public or 
private instruments. There are nevertheless two major restrictions that are con-
stitutional or intrinsic to social security. One is the restriction that the welfare 
state has to aim for solidarity within a society. In Germany this is seen in article 
20 of the constitution, which states that the Republic of Germany is a social fed-
eral state - this includes solidarity.20 A second restriction is that it has to ensure 
equality; equal treatment of everyone in similar circumstances.  
 
The last two public interests which guide the discussions on the regulatory wel-
fare state are related to the institutional framework. The interests that come to 
mind are principles related to the rule of law and of good governance. The rule 
of law has a legal connotation and contains the general principle that public bod-
ies have to apply and are restricted by legislation. Good governance has a wider 
meaning, and includes principles like transparency, and effective & efficient 
adjudication.21 
 
Regulatory welfare state: a tense relation between public and private regulation 
 
The public interests of social security are flexible with regard to the design of 
the welfare state. One could think of statutory acts providing agencies with cer-
                                                 
18 M.H.D. van Leeuwen, ‘Trade Unions and the Provision of Welfare in the Netherlands, 
1910-1960’ The Economic History Review 1997 (50), p. 764-791; A. Knotter, B. Al-
tena & D. Damsma, Labour, social policy and the welfare state, Amsterdam: Sticht-
ing beheer IIS 1997.  
19 G.J. Vonk, ‘Social Security as a Public Interest: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry into the 
Foundations of the Regulatory Welfare State’, European Journal of Social Security 
2010(12); G Esping-Andersen, ‘After the Golden Age? Welfare dilemmas in a global 
economy’, in: G Esping-Andersen (ed), Welfare states in transition: national adapta-
tions in global economies, Thousand Oaks: SAGE 1996, p. 1-30. 
20 S. Muckel, Sozialrecht, München: C.H. Beck 2009, p. 28. 
21 J. Graham, B. Amos & T. Plumptre, Good Governance in the 21st Century, Ottawa: 
Institute On Governance 2003, p. 3; D. Levi-Faur, ‘The odyssey of the regulatory 
state. Episode one: the rescue of the welfare state’ Jerusalem Papers in Regulation & 
Governance, Working paper No 39. 2011, p. 22. 





tain competences.22 This mode of realising public interests in the welfare state is 
likely to provide legal certainty and equality in transparent legal procedures. The 
disadvantages of public regulation are also known: bureaucracies seem to lack 
the capabilities to respond to the individual needs of the citizens. Esping-
Andersen furthermore points out the fact that public protection is often ‘frozen’ 
in a past socio-economic order that no longer obtains nor is capable of respond-
ing to new risks.23  
 
An alternative mode of regulation is that of privatising and market type mecha-
nisms. Contracting out with private actors and enlarging the role of private par-
ties are then the instruments used.24 These instruments have their known threats 
as well, known as market failures.25 Adverse selection, meaning that those with 
a higher risk of incapacity to work will not find access to the labour market, 
might harm interests like solidarity and equality.  
 
As a concluding remark one could say that public regulation will give reason for 
more private (market type) instruments and private regulation will cause a pub-
lic correction. This forms the expected pathology of the regulatory welfare state: 
a continuous struggle between two opposite spheres, resulting in an even more 
complex regulatory reality. 
 
3. A model of public trust  
 
The question is then how the citizen sees this complex regulatory reality. In oth-
er words, how does the regulatory welfare state affect public trust? Public trust 
is seen as trust of the citizen (the trustee) in the regulatory system and the actors 
within that system that have to make decisions and provide social security. In 
the literature on public trust, one can distinguish four factors that are relevant to 
public trust.  
 
The first factor is that of predictability. This is the approach Luhmann uses.26 
Everyone has expectations or beliefs on the way the government protects rights. 
                                                 
22 A. Tollenaar, ‘Instrumentalisation of public interests: a legal perspective’, in: G.J. 
Vonk & A. Tollenaar (eds), Social security as a public interest: A multidisciplinary 
inquiry into the foundations of the regulatory welfare state, Antwerp: Intersentia 
2010. 
23 G Esping-Andersen, ‘After the Golden Age? Welfare dilemmas in a global economy’, 
in: G Esping-Andersen (ed), Welfare states in transition: national adaptations in 
global economies, Thousand Oaks: SAGE 1996, p. 1-30. 
24 J. de Ridder, ‘Instrumentalisation of public values in social security: a public admin-
istration perspective’, in: G.J. Vonk & A. Tollenaar (eds), Social security as a public 
interest: A multidisciplinary inquiry into the foundations of the regulatory welfare 
state, Antwerp: Intersentia 2010. 
25 C.N. Teulings, A.L. Bovenberg & H.P. van Dalen, De Calculus van het publieke be-
lang, Den Haag: Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2003. 
26 N. Luhmann, Trust and power, Chichester: Wiley 1979.  





Harming these expectations will negatively affect public trust. From this per-
spective one could derive the expectation that transparent norms on the exact 
entitlements may play an important role for public trust. After all, expectations 
and beliefs are mainly based on clear cut rules and regulations on the substantive 
rights and obligations.27 
 
Clear rules and regulations alone are not sufficient for public trust. It is also a 
matter of institutionalised capability to realise these rights. This refers to what 
Craig Thomas (1998) calls ‘fiduciary trust’.28 Fiduciary trust refers to the confi-
dence of the trustee that his rights and individual position is fully respected and 
taken into account. Fiduciary trust is a characteristic of individual relationships. 
For fiduciary trust, it is important that the actors in this relationship are aware of 
each other’s competences and responsibilities. Fiduciary trust furthermore re-
quires that there is a corrective mechanism if the other party in the relationship 
does not respect the interests of the trustee.29 From this perspective two factors 
might play a role for public trust. Firstly, the extent to which the trusted actor 
has clear responsibilities. This would imply that the incentives and agenda have 
to be transparent. The second factor deals with the availability and complexity 
of procedures to correct the trusted actor.  
 
The corrective mechanisms refer to a third perspective on trust: that of institu-
tional-based trust. Some institutions enjoy a trust that is seldom questioned.30 
One may think of legal procedures or democratic decision-making. Institutions 
like these have a history-based positive effect on public trust. This becomes vis-
ible when the design of an institution is changed. When for example access in a 
legal procedure is made more difficult, this potentially has a negative effect on 
public trust. This results in the fourth factor of public trust: the extent to which 
procedures differ from trusted institutions like democratic procedures or known 
legal procedures.  
 
The four identified factors form a descriptive model of public trust. The clarity 
of rules, the clarity of responsibilities, the availability of corrective mechanisms 
and the quality of these procedures are factors that potentially affect public trust.  
 
The next step is to ‘fill’ this model: what are the exact variables that are meant 
with clarity of rules, responsibilities, corrective mechanisms and procedures? To 
answer this question, systems of social security in two countries have been com-
                                                 
27 R. Bachmann, Trust and power as means of co-ordinating the internal relations of the 
organization – a conceptual framework, Groningen: University of Groningen 2002. 
28 Craig W Thomas, ‘Maintaining and Restoring public trust in Government agencies 
and their employees’, Administration & Society 1998 (30), p. 166-193. 
29 Craig W Thomas, ‘Maintaining and Restoring public trust in Government agencies 
and their employees’, Administration & Society 1998 (30), p. 166-193. 
30 Craig W Thomas, ‘Maintaining and Restoring public trust in Government agencies 
and their employees’, Administration & Society 1998 (30), p. 166-193. 





pared: Germany and The Netherlands. Both countries have a relatively high trust 
in the government and in the legal system,31 and are comparable in the sense that 
both countries are mainly occupational welfare states, meaning that the coverage 
of social security aims to protect the income of the employee.32 
 
The major distinction between The Netherlands and Germany is that in Dutch 
legislation the cause of sickness or disability is irrelevant and the coverage is 
extended to the so-called ‘risque social’ instead of only the ‘risque professionel’. 
In German law the cause of sickness or disability is a relevant factor for the type 
and amount of benefits. In Germany benefits are not only meant as an income 
protection, but also as a compensation of damages.33 This distinction is relevant 
to understand the differences between the two states.  
 
The comparison focuses on two elements of income security for employees who 
report illness or who become disabled. Particularly in this part of social security, 
one might find a mixture of public and private instruments, since it is founded 
on a private relationship between employer and employee. The two elements 
that are compared are firstly the distribution of responsibilities between the em-
ployer and the government (section 4) and secondly the assessment of medical 
facts (section 5).  
 
4. Continued payment of salary and sickness benefits 
 
What happens if the employee reports in sick? Is there an entitlement to contin-
ued payment of salary or a (public) benefits? The regulatory framework often 
contains a combination of both. The result is a shared responsibility of both the 
state and the employer.34  
 
                                                 
31 According to the Eurobarometer 50% of the citizens in The Netherlands and 48% of 
the citizens in Germany answered that they ‘tend to trust the national government’, 
based on a survey in 2014. To compare: in Greece 16% tend to trust the government 
and in Belgium 43%. Trust in the legal system is 60% in Germany and 65% in the 
Netherlands (based on a survey in 2010). In the European Social Survey on 2012 
these percentages are even higher: 70% for Germany and 80% for the Netherlands.  
32 G. Bonoli, ‘Classifying Welfare States: a Two-dimension approach’ Journal of Social 
Policy 1997 (26), p. 351-372; E. Immergut, ‘Between state and market: sickness bene-
fit and social control’, in: M. Rein & L. Rainwater (eds), Public/private interplay in 
social protection: A comparative study, N.Y.: Sharpe 1986, p. 57-98. 
33 S. Klosse, Menselijke schade: vergoeden of herstellen?, Antwerpen: Maklu 1989. 
34 A. Nentjes & E. Woerdman, ‘Instrumentalisation of the public interest in social secu-
rity: an economic perspective’, in: G.J. Vonk & A. Tollenaar (eds), Social security as 
a public interest: A multidisciplinary inquiry into the foundations of the regulatory 
welfare state, Antwerp: Intersentia 2010. 







The German Civil Code (Burgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB) contains the principle 
‘no work, no pay’. This principle has an exception in article 326 II: if the em-
ployee is unable to work due to sickness, the employer is obliged to continue 
paying the wages for the first six weeks.35 This right to continued payment of 
wages is regulated in the Entgeltfortzahlunggesetz. After six weeks of sickness 
the employee is entitled to the (public) statutory health insurance funds (Krank-
enkassen). 
 
The main goal of the Entgeltfortzahlunggesetz is to consolidate employees’ in-
come security when unable to work due to sickness. The act transfers the re-
sponsibility and liability for employees’ income security to their employer. The 
cause of sickness is not relevant.36 Only if the sickness is caused by an accident 
and a third party can be held liable for said accident, does an employer have a 
right of recourse against the third party. The employee has to cooperate and to 
support the execution of this right.  
 
The responsibility for continued payment during sickness forms a serious finan-
cial risk for employers with few employees. To cover this risk there is a public 
compensation scheme for these small companies. For employers with fewer than 
30 employees the Aufwendungsausgleichgesetz (AAG) provides the opportunity 
to reclaim 80% to 100% of the Entgeltfortzahlung at the public Krankenkasse. 
 
The Entgeltfortzahlung is an important transfer of income security of employees 
to the private sphere. The importance is underlined by the fact that about 90% of 
the income for sick and disabled employees rests upon the employers in the 
form of Entgeltfortzahlung. The remaining, 10% of the costs of income security 




In The Netherlands, employees who are unable to work due to sickness, are enti-
tled to sickness benefits, under the rules laid down in the sickness benefit act 
(Ziektewet, ZW). Under this act, the entitlement to sickness benefits only exists 
if there is no right to payment of wages (art. 29 ZW). Under the Civil Code 
(Burgerlijk Wetboek, BW) the employee has the right to continued payment of 
70% of the last earned wages for the first two years (104 weeks) of sickness (art. 
7:629 BW). In practice this percentage is often higher, depending on the agree-
ments with trade unions in the collective labour agreements. In any case, the 
                                                 
35 A. Junker, Grundkurs Arbeitsrecht, München: Beck 2009, p. 528. 
36 J Schmitt, Entgeltfortzahlungsgesetz und Aufwendungsausgleichgesetz, München: 
Beck 2007, p. 2. 
37 A. Junker, Grundkurs Arbeitsrecht, München: Beck 2009, p. 155. 





public safety net of the Ziektewet functions only as a safety net in case the em-
ployer is incapable of continuing to pay wages (for example due to bankruptcy).  
 
It goes without saying that the obligation to continue paying wages form a huge 
risk for the employer. The employer can decide to take out insurance for this 
risk with a private insurance company. There is no public interference with this 
insurance, except for the fiscal incentive that the employer can deduct the con-
tributions from corporate taxes. 
 
The transfer of the risk of loss of income to the employer was initially believed 
to provide an incentive for the employer to invest in improving working condi-
tions and reducing absenteeism.38 The fact that the employer has to pay the bill 
was expected to form an incentive for the employer to carefully monitor the rea-
sons for sickness and to ensure a quick reintegration of the employee. In addi-
tion, the legislation also contains an entitlement for the employee that the em-
ployer would take re-integrative measures to enable him to work. An employee 




The obligation of continued payment of wages during sickness can serve many 
goals. One goal might be maintaining income security for the employee, which 
is, especially in the German situation, a relevant factor where the employer has 
to pay full salary for the first six weeks. Another goal is to lower the bureaucrat-
ic costs of assessing the claim of the sick employee. Since the employer is re-
sponsible, the claim has to be settled in the private relations between employee 
and employer first.  
 
The obligation to continue paying wages in The Netherlands for two years forms 
an incentive for the employer to prevent sickness or disability. The private in-
surance market that covers this risk will even be stricter in enforcing these ef-
forts, for example, in the form of higher premiums if the employer has many 
sick employees.  
 
What does this comparison show concerning the model of public trust? The enti-
tlements as such are rather clear: in Germany full salary during six weeks fol-
lowed by Krankengeld, based on statutory acts. In The Netherlands the entitle-
ment is at least 70% of the earned income, but this may be more depending on 
the collective labour agreement. It is however especially less clear regarding the 
right to re-integration what the entitlements of employees are. For this part the 
employer might feel an incentive to invest in changing working circumstances to 
                                                 
38 Explanatory Memorandum of the Wet Terugdringing Ziekteverzuim (TK, 1992-1993, 
22899, nr. 3), p. 19. 





enable the sick employee to work again, but the employer might also calculate 
costs and conclude that these investments are unprofitable.  
 
In Germany the smaller companies do not feel the incentive that is related to the 
Entgeltfortzahlung. For this category the responsibilities are not clear. For larger 
companies it is just as in The Netherlands: the employer is fully responsible for 
income security for the employee, insofar as the employer has a clear responsi-
bility to do what it takes to provide income security.  
 
With regard to corrective mechanisms, the shared responsibility during the first 
phase of sickness causes in both countries high thresholds, since the rights have 
to be enforced using ordinary court procedures. In Germany this ends after six 
weeks; in the Netherlands the employee has to enforce their rights in ordinary 
court procedures during the first two years of sickness.  
 
Finally, the question whether or not the private part of social security crowds out 
trusted institutions remains. In Germany the private part is rather limited and the 
roles of the employer and Krankenkasse are rather clear. For the employee this 
means that it is rather easy, or at least clear, as to how he or she has to enforce 
the entitlements. Compared to this, the Dutch situation is a more serious threat 
to public trust, since an employee is in a mixed situation with the employer. An 
employer might hire company doctors or insurance companies to assess on his 
behalf. For the employee this results in a rather unclear situation of who he has 
to address and which procedures he then can use. This design uses institutions 
that do not have a trusted reputation. It is actually on the contrary; private law 
procedures are often associated with an abuse of powers. The employee is a one-
shotter who has to enforce his rights in a procedure against a repeat-player (the 
insurance company hired by the employer) while the procedure as such does not 
compensate this inequality.39  
 
The next table summarizes the comparison on the four factors of public trust 
related to the first phase of continued payment of salary and sickness benefits.  
 
                                                 
39 Marc Galanter, ‘Why the “haves” come out ahead: speculations on the limits of legal 
change’, Law andSociety Review 1974 (1), p. 165-230. 





Table 1. Public trust in the first phase of sickness 
 Germany The Netherlands 
Clear rules Yes: full salary during 
six weeks 
Partly: salary depends 
on collective labour 
agreement, re-
integration is not 
regulated 
Clear responsibilities Partly: small employers 
receive compensation 
and don’t feel an incen-
tive 
Yes: for the first two 





dures against the em-
ployer, administrative 
procedures after six 
No: high thresholds 
since corrective 
mechanisms are part of 
labour law 
Trusted institutions Yes: the employee has 
to deal with his em-
ployer and the public 
agencies  




cedures are not clear  
 
5. Assessing incapability of work 
 
Entitlements to continued payment of wages or to public benefits are based on 
the question of whether or not the employee is ‘sick’ and ‘incapable of work’. 
These definitions need an assessment of medical facts by medical professionals. 
In this medical assessment, various public and private instruments seem rele-
vant, such as the (contractual) relation between the medical professional and the 




The entitlement to Entgeltfortzahlung depends on ‘incapacity for work’ (ar-
beitsunfähigkeit) that is caused by ‘sickness’. When an employee reports sick-
ness he is obliged to inform his employer of the expected length of his sickness 
(§ 5 EntgFG). If the sickness will be longer than three days, the employee has to 
provide a medical notice, written by a doctor that states the expected duration of 
the sickness.40 
 
Any doctor can write medical notices. The only requirement is that the doctor is 
certified. When writing a medical notice, the doctor has to apply the guidelines 
                                                 
40 W. Hunold, Krankheit des Arbeitnehmers, Rudolf Haufe Freiburg 1994, p. 112; H. 
Vogelsang, Entgeltfortzahlung, München: C.H. Beck, 2003, p. 26. 





laid down by the Gemeinsame Bundesausschuss, a professional association of 
doctors and medical practitioners. The authority to formulate these guidelines is 
laid down in § 92 of book 5 the social security act. The guidelines define inca-
pacity for work as the situation where the sickness makes it impossible for the 
employee to do the job, or will worsen when doing the job.41 The rules state that 
the doctor has to ask about the details of the job, the demands of the job and has 
to assess whether or not there is a causal relationship between the sickness and 
performing the job activities.42 Furthermore, these rules state that the medical 
notice has to be based on a ‘medical assessment’ (§ 4 paragraph, 1 Richtlinien). 
If a doctor does not obey the rules laid down in the guidelines, he runs the risk 
of being fined.43 
 
If the employee fails to provide a medical notice the employer may refuse fur-
ther payment (§ 7 EntgFG). If the employer doubts the quality of the medical 
notice, the employer has the option of informing the medical service of the statu-
tory health insurances (Krankenkassen). This medical service then has to check 
whether or not the medical assessment by the doctor meets the criteria demand-




In the Netherlands incapability of work due to sickness occurs when the em-
ployee is physically not able to work, or work will harm his health. Once the 
employee reports ill, it is the employer who has to agree that the employee is 
truly ‘too ill to work’. For this assessment the employer might ask the company 
doctor for advice. The Working Conditions Act obliges employers to contract a 
company doctor or company advisor, to supervise the company policy on absen-
teeism. This company doctor has access to all (medical) information necessary, 
including medical files. He can even call in the employee for a medical assess-
ment. With regard to the company doctor the only requirement is that these pro-
fessionals have a certificate (art. 14 Working Conditions Act). However, which 
rules they apply and how they assess whether or not the employee is truly ill and 
incapable for work, is not made explicit. The rules that are applied are often pro-
fessional protocols, meant as general standards of the most common causes of 
incapability to work. These protocols are not binding nor provide entitlements to 
the employee. 
 
If an employee does not cooperate with the medical assessment, or if the com-
pany doctor judges that the employee is not incapable of doing his job, the em-
                                                 
41 H Vogelsang, Entgeltfortzahlung, München: C.H. Beck 2003, p. 28. 
42 See: §, 2 par. 5 Richtlinien über die Beurteilung der Arbeitsunfähigkeit und die 
Maßnahmen zur stufenweisen Wiedereingliederung, of the Gemeinsame Bundesauss-
chuss 01.12.2003 BAnz. Nr. 61 (S. 6501) vom, 27.03.2004.  
43 W. Hunold, Krankheit des Arbeitnehmers, Freiburg: Rudolf Haufe 1994, p. 102. 





ployer can impose a ‘pay freeze’, meaning that the employee does not receive 
wages until he cooperates or returns to his job. If the employer imposes a ‘pay 
freeze’, the employee has to start action for recovering the wages, stating that he 
is truly ill and incapable of work. In this procedure the employee must first ap-
ply for a so-called ‘expert review’ by a medical advisor appointed by the em-
ployee insurance agency, the public body that is responsible for the payment of 
invalidity benefits (art. 7:629a BW). This expert review has high practical value. 
If the medical advisor judges that the employee is incapable of work due to 
sickness, the employee has a stronger position in the legal procedure to claim his 
wages. On the other hand, if the medical advisor concludes that the employee is 
not incapable of work due to sickness, the position of the employee in the pro-
cedure for recovering wages is very weak. 
 
Dutch law does not contain specific requirements with regard to the authority to 
assess whether or not the employee is incapable of work. There are, for example, 
no specific requirements with regard to the expert appointed by the employee 
insurance agency who gives the ‘expert review’. It is further unclear where the 
employee can address complaints regarding this expert review, since this review 
is not regarded a ‘decision’ in the meaning of the General Administrative Law 




The assessment of medical facts is mainly publicly regulated in Germany, 
whereas in the Netherlands it is primarily a private matter between employee 
and employer. The medical notice in Germany is provided by general practition-
ers who act more or less as public agents. In The Netherlands the question of 
whether or not the employee is truly incapable for work is first of all a private 
dispute between employee and employer. The employee has to cooperate if the 
employer wishes to investigate the grounds of absenteeism and the employee 
runs the risk of losing wages due to the pay freeze. The ‘expert review’ can be 
seen as an attempt to compensate this unequal relationship. It is debatable 
whether or not this requirement is truly a support for the employee. After all, 
with a negative expert review it becomes quite impossible to plead the case that 
the employee is really ill.  
 
Seen from a perspective of public trust it is interesting to notice that the exact 
rules on who is incapable for work and who not is regulated quite differently in 
The Netherlands and Germany. In The Netherlands, it is up to the professional 
standards of the company doctor and the doctor of the public agency to assess 
the incapability to work. The protocols they use are not relevant in court proce-
dures. The procedures used when developing these protocols are not regulated. 
                                                 
44 See: A.M.P. Rijpkema, Toegang tot het recht bij ziekte en arbeidsongeschiktheid, 
Deventer: Kluwer 2013. 





Compared to this, the German Richtlinien seem to be the result of delegated 
rule-making. The legal basis is made explicit, giving a competence to promul-
gate these rules. In practice these rules will play a more important role since the 
assessment of incapability for work by the general practitioner has to be based 
on these rules.  
 
Regarding the responsibilities, the picture is mixed as well. In Germany it is 
striking that the general practitioner can assess whether or not his client is inca-
pable for work. For this assessment the general practitioner does not have to 
know anything about the actual working situation and whether or not the em-
ployer would be able to offer a different kind of work. In that sense the respon-
sibilities are clearly demarcated. In The Netherlands, the responsibilities are 
concentrated with the employer; he has to agree on the incapability to work and 
can ask a company doctor for advice. This may provide the opportunity to make 
tailor-made decisions, meaning that the employer would be able to offer work 
that suits the specific handicaps that the employee faces.  
 
The other side of the coin is that in this system the corrective mechanisms are 
not easy to use. In case of a dispute the procedure is quite burdensome for the 
employee. The expert review by the public agency provides only limited sup-
port, since this review cannot be questioned. Compared to this, the German sys-
tem has clear corrective mechanisms; correspondingly also for an employer who 
thinks that the medical notice is inadequate.  
 
The mixture of procedures in The Netherlands is also relevant for the last factor 
of trusted institutions. The expert review is an intervention meant to strengthen 
the position of the employee. This already shows that the original design, in 
which the employee and employer have to solve their issues together, has its 
problems and does not promote public trust. The expert review can be seen as an 
attempt to solve this issue, but it is then striking that this review cannot be ques-
tioned in administrative procedures. Compared to this, the German system con-
tains administrative procedures that normally do promote public trust.  
 





The next table contains a summary of this analysis.  
 
Table 2. Public trust when assessing sickness 
 Germany The Netherlands 
Clear rules Yes: guidelines promul-
gated by the medical 
association  
No: medical protocols 
with a vague status 
Clear responsibilities Yes: general practitioner 
has to assess incapability 
for work 
No: the employer is 
fully responsible for 
agreeing on 
incapability for work. 
Corrective mechanisms Yes: Krankenkassen can 
intervene 
Partly: there is a proce-
dure (expert review) 
but the employee can-
not fully challenge the 
assessments of this 
reviewer 
Trusted institutions Yes: administrative 
court procedures 
No: mixed procedures, 
with expert review that 
cannot be challenged 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
What are the consequences of mixed public and private social security for public 
trust? With the observation that social security contains more and more private 
elements, this question seems very relevant. Public trust is described as a de-
pendent variable in a model with four factors. These factors are clear rules and 
norms on substantive rights and obligations, clearly demarcated responsibilities, 
the availability of corrective mechanisms, and the use of institutions that have a 
trusted reputation. In a regulatory welfare state, it is likely that these factors are 
affected and therefore that public trust is endangered.  
 
The comparison of the actual regulation of the social security in The Nether-
lands and Germany show many differences in the balance between public and 
private social security. The general tendency is that the public regulation is re-
treating, leaving room for private initiatives. With regard to the substantive 
rights on continued payment of salary when reporting sick, the employee in The 
Netherlands is depending on vague standards and protocols that do not have a 
legal effect. On the other hand, in the Dutch situation the employee and employ-
er are able to work out solutions together and finding work that is still feasible 
with the experienced physical obstacles. This is aimed at preventing long-term 
absenteeism.  
 





In this regard the German design is more clear, with clear distinctions between 
public and private responsibilities and clear rules on who is incapable for work 
and who is not. The privatisation in Germany is mainly seen as an instrument to 
avoid too much bureaucracy. A short period of continued payment of wages, 
combined with the compensation scheme for smaller companies makes it less 
likely that the medical facts will be disputed. Therefore, there is no reason to 
compensate the weak position of the employee, and responsibilities are clearly 
distinguished.   
 
The comparison in this contribution focuses only on two aspects, related to the 
income security of sick employees. With the model of public trust one might be 
able to fully assess the quality of a regulatory design in terms of promoting or 
harming public trust.  
 
To conclude; if one compares the two systems of social security it seems more 
likely that public trust is better maintained in Germany. At least the score on the 
factors in our model seems more positive for the German system. The Dutch 
system contains more private elements, with new public corrective mechanisms. 
This system is therefore an example of the regulatory paradox: private instru-
ments to replace failing public provision result in even more, but slightly differ-
ent public interference, resulting in an even more complex regulatory welfare 
state.  
 
Though the comparison shows a different pathology the tendency in both coun-
tries is similar. Recent German developments with institutionalised competition 
between statutory and private health insurance show also that in Germany the 
search for efficiency comes with regulatory complexity. It is therefore interest-
ing to monitor the consequences with regard to public trust. Will solidarity in-
deed fade away? To answer that question (more) empirical data is needed. Or, as 
the German constitutional court judged in its decision on the reform of the 
health insurance stated: ‘Expectations of the legislator on the functioning of spe-
cific instruments can prove to be wrong. That should be a reason to correct the 
law.’45  
                                                 
45 BVerfG, 1 BvR 706/08 vom, 10.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. 170. 
